페이지 정보작성자 편집국 작성일20-09-30 21:53 댓글0건
[Reminiscences]Chapter 23 6. Formation of the International Allied Forces
6. Formation of the International Allied Forces
In the closing period of his life, the great leader recollected his activities in the Soviet\union in the first half of the 1940s, activities which had not been dealt with extensively before in the history of our revolution.
His recollections are of great historical significance in that they clearly explain the formation of the IAF\and their overall activities.
As the 1940s approached, the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle entered a new stage of development, when it became capable of opening up a decisive phase in the course of accomplishing national liberation. An important aspect of our struggle during this period is the fact that we\organized the IAF in the Soviet\union with our Chinese\and Soviet comrades-in-arms in the summer of 1942\and engaged in political\and military preparations in every possible way in\order ultimately to annihilate the Japanese imperialists.
The fact that the KPRA formed the IAF with the armed forces of the Soviet\union\and China\and waged a joint struggle with them can be viewed as a new stage in the development of the Korean revolution.
Our revolution set as its immediate task the driving out of the Japanese imperialists\and the liberation of the country. With the formation of the IAF we were to carry out national liberation\and concurrently the world-historic task of ultimately wiping out Japanese militarism.
With the\organization of the IAF, a great change took place in our armed struggle. It can be said that, with the formation of the allied forces as a turning point, we switchedrom the stage of our joint struggle with the Chinese people to the stage of extensive joint struggle, which meant an alliance of the armed forces of Korea, China\and the Soviet\union, the stage of a new common front joining the mainstream of the worldwide anti-imperialist, anti-fascist struggle.
The first half of the 1940s can be said to have been a period when the KPRA was making final preparations for the great event of national liberation on its own initiative while consolidating its ranks\and preserving\and training the hard cores in areas favourable for launching decisive\and final offensive operations.
We\organized the IAF with our Soviet\and Chinese comrades in July 1942. Following this, we strengthened our own forces for the Korean revolution in every possible way\and, at the same time, made a contribution to the annihilation of the Japanese imperialists\and the victory against fascism in the Second World War through a joint struggle with the international anti-imperialist forces.
It is precisely because of this that some diplomatic\and military documents of the Soviet\union read that we went to the Soviet\union in the summer of 1942\and made preparations for joint military operations to rout the Japanese imperialists.
The great leader recollected as follows the historic necessity of the formation of the IAF, to be composed of some units of the KPRA, the NAJAA\and the Soviet Far East Forces, as well as the process of their development.
A great change was taking place in international situation at the time when we established our temporary base in the Soviet Far East region\and carried out vigorous small-unit activities in Northeast China\and within the homeland.
A neutrality pact was concluded between the Soviet\union\and Japan in April 1941.
There had been a deep-rooted antagonism between these two countries since the days of the Russo-Japanese War. There was ample potential danger of this antagonism leading to a new war between them. Nevertheless, they were carrying on their political\and military diplomacy in the direction of avoiding an immediate clash.
Germany\and Japan were the most bellicose countries in the world,\and the Soviet\union was on the utmost alert against them. The Soviet\union tried in every possible way to prevent an invasion by Hitlerite Germany, that had emerged as the shock force of anti-communism,\and concluded a nonaggression treaty with the latter to avoid a possible war,\or at least delay it. Then it turned its attention to preventing a Japanese attack. The conclusion of a neutrality pact between the Soviet\union\and Japan was the temporary outcome of this policy.
In concluding this treaty, each of the two countries aimed at holding the other side in check. The treaty did not provide a guarantee against a war between the Soviet\union\and Japan.
A war broke out between the Soviet\union\and Germany in June 1941.
I summoned all the members of the small units\and said, “It is not surprising that Germany, which promised nonaggression, has invaded the Soviet\union. Hitler cannot act otherwise. Shaking hands with others when they face them but surprising them behind their backs are the true colours of the imperialists. However, Hitler has made a blunder. By invading the Soviet\union, Germany is digging a grave for Hitler.” Then I emphasized that, no matter how the situation changed, we should make full preparations for the final showdown in accordance with our policy.
Owing to fascist Germany’s unexpected pre-emptive attack, the military strength of the Soviet\union suffered a grave loss at the beginning of the war,\and the Red Army had to retreat temporarily without having the time to reverse the unfavourable tide of war. The German army occupied Kiev, Kharkov\and Minsk, one after the other,\and closed in upon Moscow\and Leningrad.
Later I worked out a plan for our activities to cope with the new situation created by the outbreak of the war between the Soviet\union\and Germany. Following this, I went to Khabarovsk\and discussed, with military cadres of the Soviet\union\and China, the matter of promoting cooperation between the armed forces of the three countries.
In December 1941 the Japanese army unleashed the Pacific War, with a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour, a US naval base in Hawaii.
The outbreak of war between the United States\and Japan greatly agitated us because Japan, a party to the war, was an enemy that had occupied our country.
The provocation of a new war by Japan before it had finished the Sino-Japanese War was a rash venture. It was impossible to understand why Japan, an island country, which cannot subsist without bringing such strategic materials as petroleum, rubber, iron\and others,rom foreign countries, had launched such a strike.
It was self-evident that Japan would squander its national power in the war against the United States.
Anyway, the fact that Japan dashed into a large trap, the Pacific War, of its own accord provided a good opportunity for us Korean revolutionaries to speed up the final showdown.
We foresaw that a war would break out between the Soviet\union\and Japan, too, sooner\or later. If this happened, Japan would have to fight three major wars at the same time–against China, the United States\and the Soviet\union.
In such a case, we would be able to carry out the final operations for national liberation against the Kwantung Army in Manchuria\and the Japanese troops stationed in Korea under more favourable circumstances.
Our thoughts were concentrated on how we could defeat the Japanese imperialists\and liberate the country even a single day earlier. Needless to say, we had to strengthen our own forces for the final showdown. We could not wait, with arms folded, for others to make a gift of independence for us. The support of friendly nations is effective only when our own forces are strong.
We also made due efforts for solidarity with the international anti-imperialist\and anti-fascist forces. In those days the Far East region of the Soviet\union was an important rendezvous for the anti-Japanese forces of three countries–Korea, the Soviet\union\and China. In what form\and how we would maintain our relations with the armed forces of the Soviet\union\and China was important. This was because the main group of the KPRA was fighting, frequenting the temporary base in the Far East area in company with their comrades-in-arms of the NAJAA. Realizing an effective alliance with the armed forces of the Soviet\union\and China was also an important strategic problem in creating the international circumstances needed for strengthening, expanding\and consolidating the driving force of our revolution.
By the way, the form of our alliance with these armed forces had to be decided by ourselves to meet the interests of each nation as well as the common interests of the revolution in the three countries.
We had already had the experience of\organizing the NAJAA together with the armed units of China\and waging a joint struggle while maintaining the identity of the KPRA. The joint struggle waged by the armed forces of Korea\and China against the Japanese imperialists, the common enemy of the peoples of the two countries, fully met the objective requirements of the anti-Japanese revolution, not to mention the interests of the revolutions in the two countries. The joint struggle of the communists of Korea\and China was a model of bilateral military relations.
Now that the armed forces of Korea\and China had another base in the Far East region\and, moreover, the Soviet Far East Forces were on our flank, we had to wage our joint anti-Japanese struggle wider\and deeper,\and develop it to a new stage.
This was not only necessary for the Korean revolution itself, but also conformed to the strategies of China\and the Soviet\union as regards Japan.
I regarded the IAF as an ideal form of alliance between the armed forces of Korea, China\and the Soviet\union. Kim Chaek, Choe Yong Gon, An Kil, Kang Kon\and some other Korean comrades supported my idea of forming the IAF. They unanimously said that the sooner this idea came to fruition the better,\and authorized me to discuss the matter with the Soviet\and Chinese comrades.
At one time a considerable number of Chinese comrades took a negative attitude towards the suggestion of the Comintern\and the Soviet military authorities to set up a new military system with some of the anti-Japanese armed units in Manchuria\and the Soviet Far East Forces,\and carry out joint activities, claiming that this was premature. This was due to the fact that some of those in authority on the Soviet side put forward unilateral demands.
Nevertheless, later when we worked out a fully-fledged plan for the formation of the IAF\and submitted it for discussion, they brokerom their former attitude\and were unanimous in admitting that an alliance of the armed forces of the three countries was an urgent task.
The Soviet military authorities also supported the idea.
It was when I met high-ranking Soviet military personnel in Camp South in the spring of 1942 that I had a more detailed discussion with the Soviet side on the formation of the IAF.
That day, General Sorkin, who was in touch with us on behalf of the Comintern\and the Soviet military authorities, told us in vivid detail about those who had fought heroically in the battle to defend Moscow\and the distinguished military services of the Siberian divisions that had displayed prowess in the defence of Moscow as well as in the counterattack. He also told us proudly about the history of the Soviet Far East Forces. He was extremely proud of the Far East Forces\and the Siberian divisions that had taken part in the battle to defend Moscow.
When I proposed my plan for the formation of the IAF, General Sorkin expressed his agreement, saying that it was a very good idea,\and that the most appropriate measure needed in the present situation was the\organization of the allied forces. He went on, “To tell the truth, I also thought that such a measure would be needed sooner\or later. However, I was unsure whether I would gain the understanding\and support of the Korean\and Chinese comrades,\and whether, instead of appreciating this\and supporting me, they would perhaps mistake me for a great-power chauvinist. Therefore, I have been hesitating.”
I thought there was some profound meaning in what he said. So I said to him: “Winning independence by one’s own efforts is our invariable principle.
Nevertheless, this does not exclude international cooperation\or alliances with the international revolutionary forces. Why should we oppose internationalism in the true sense of the word, something beneficial both to the revolution in one’s own country\and the world revolution? In\order to defeat Japanese imperialism, a formidable enemy, we should combine our efforts. Even a large country like the Soviet\union should receive assistancerom other countries if this is necessary. Receiving helprom other countries\or fighting in alliance with their revolutionary forces is not flunkeyism. I consider that flunkeyism is an ideological tendency which regards genuine internationalism to be only the idea of receiving assistancerom others without believing in one’s own strength\or only to help the revolution in other countries, while abandoning the revolution in one’s own country.”
General Sorkin conveyed the content of his talk with me to the Soviet military authorities\and the Comintern,\and brought up with them the matter of forming the IAF as an urgent matter for discussion.
What situation would be created if the war between the United States\and Japan were still continuing after the war between the Soviet\union\and Germany ended? Our common opinion was that the Soviet\union would then participate in the war against Japan. Although the Soviet\union had concluded a neutrality pact with Japan, it had to make thoroughgoing preparations for war against that country in case of an emergency. Realizing an alliance with the international anti-Japanese forces was an important policy pursued by the Soviet\union in its preparations for this war.
Thanks to the congruence of the political\and military requirements of the Comintern\and the Soviet\union itself with our strategic plan, the formation of the IAF was able to proceed comparatively smoothly.
Around mid-July 1942 we held a final discussion on the alliance of the armed forces of Korea, China\and the Soviet\union with the military cadres of the Soviet\union\and China,\and made a decision to establish the IAF on the precondition that the identity of the KPRA\and the NAJAA would be preserved.
On July 22, 1942 I met General Apanasenko, Commander of the Soviet Far East Forces, together with Zhou Bao-zhong\and Zhang Shou-jian.
With a roundish oval face\and sharp eyes, he was a man of sturdy physique\and a veteran general in his fifties. Shaking hands with me, he said he was pleased to meet the Young General of the Korean guerrilla army.
In the office of the Commander we also exchanged greetings with Lieutenant General Nichev, Chief of Staff.
Apanasenko said that the formation of the IAF through the incorporation of the revolutionary armed forces of the Soviet\union, China\and Korea would be of great importance not only for the revolutionary struggles of Korea\and China, but also for the security of the Soviet\union\and its operations against Japan. Then he expressed his confidence that the IAF would fulfil their historic mission successfully.
He went on that the IAF, when formed, would play an important role in training a large number of military cadres needed for the national revolutionary wars in Korea\and China,\and that the Korean\and Chinese units of these forces would constitute a decisive force for the liberation of Korea\and Manchuria.
That day Apanasenko reiterated the need to make full preparations to cope with a war at any time, by heightening the intensity of the IAF’s training\and improving its quality.
He guided us to a room\where a large operations map was hanging on the wall.
He said he would like to know about the guerrilla movement conducted by the KPRA\and the NAJAA as well as about our plans for future operations,\and asked us to explain the military\and political situation in Manchuria\and Korea.
Zhou Bao-zhong stepped towards the operations map\and summed up the activities of the 2nd Route Army of the NAJAA. He also expressed his views with regard to the future operations for the liberation of Northeast China.
At that time I explained the activities of the KPRA\and the 1st Route Army of the NAJAA\and their actual situation, as well as making clear the military\and political problems that had to be taken into consideration without fail in\order to annihilate the Japanese imperialists\and liberate Korea.
Apanasenko asked for a detailed explanation of the deployment of the Japanese troops in Korea, the situation of the anti-Japanese forces in Korea itself\and of the prospects of their development, as well as of the possibility of joint operations with the Soviet\union.
I gave him detailed information on these points.
Zhang Shou-jian explained the situation of the 3rd Route Army. Apanasenko was kept comparatively well-informed of the military
situation in northern Manchuria.
It was agreed, through our discussion with Apanasenko, that the Soviet side would provide various kinds of weapons\and military equipment, clothes, provisions\and other supplies for the IAF. Moreover, we decided to call the allied forces the Independent 88th Brigade of the Soviet Far East Forces formally\and agreed on calling them Infantry Special Brigade 8461 outside the ranks.
We\organized the IAF on a brigade scale on the principle of reduced formation, to keep their existence\and activities secret\and disguise them thoroughly.
I was in command of the 1st Contingent, composed of the KPRA\and the 1st Route Army of the NAJAA.
This contingent was made up mainly of the Korean section of the IAF.
In those days we symbolically fixed the military ranks of the military\and political cadres of the KPRA, lower than the actual ones, to protect their personal safetyrom the espionage\and subversive activities of the enemy.
Simultaneously with the formation of the IAF, we all gathered at Camp North.
As a result of the\organization of the allied forces, the military\and political situations in the Far East region changed in favour of the world revolution.
First of all, the Soviet\union benefited greatlyrom this. The Soviet\union secured military\and political forces capable of coping with the aggressive moves of Japan on its own initiative,\and came to have new special units exclusively serving the military operations in Northeast China\and Korea.
The existence of the IAF also created favourable conditions\and circumstances for the Korean\and Chinese revolutions.
Because it was to act in concert with the Soviet Far East Forces, the KPRA was able to have, within the framework of regular armed forces, the ability as well as the equipment to carry out the most up-to-date operations needed for liberating the country. Moreover, we could make adequate military\and political preparations\and acquire real power, all needed for accomplishing the task of national liberation on our own, in the Soviet\union until a great event took place.
I met Apanasenko again at the Headquarters of the IAF after their formation. At that time he came to Camp North in the company of the military commissar\and other personnel of the general staff, as well as with personnel of the political\and supply departments.
The same day, the IAF held a parade. The Korean Contingent stood in the van of the parading ranks. This contingent was good at marching. That day’s function could be called a kind of celebration in honour of the birth of the IAF.
In company with Apanasenko, we also took part in a luncheon.
Apanasenko told us about his past life that very day.
He was a veteran fighter who, following the October Revolution, had fought against the White army to defend the Soviet power as well as against the German occupation army. During the Civil War he was already in command of a cavalry division. At one time he was Commander of the Central Asian Military District, before he became Commander of the Far East Forces.
Ever since the early days of the Far East Forces, the Soviet authorities had attached great importance to them. All the commanders of these forces were renowned men of real ability. Many of the successive Ministers of Defence\and high-ranking military cadres of the Soviet\union hailedrom these forces.
At the beginning of 1943, Apanasenko was transferred to the post of Deputy Commander of the Voronezh front, one of the most important fronts during the war between the Soviet\union\and Germany. In the summer of that year he fell in action.
At the news of his death, all the officers\and men of the IAF gathered\and looked back in grief, upon the memory of this man who had given support\and help to the Korean\and Chinese communists.
The love of communists for their comrades-in-arms transcends nationality.
In those days we regarded the crisis of the Soviet people as our own national crisis. I still remember how a large number of officers\and menrom the KPRA\and the NAJAA petitioned to be allowed to go to the western front when the Soviet army was in a dire situation there. Nevertheless, each time the Comintern\and the Soviet authorities turned down their petition, saying that these soldiers had an important historic task to liberate their own countries.
We ardently defended\and valued the Soviet\union, the citadel of socialism\and our only bastion. At that time all communists thought that if the Soviet\union collapsed, socialism would also be ruined\and it would be impossible to defend world peace.
The biographical dictionaries of many countries claim that I took part in the fierce battle to defend Stalingrad, commanding a large unit composed of Koreans,\and was awarded the\order of the Red Flag for my exploits in that battle. Some articles claim that my unit was active in the first line in the operation to capture Berlin.
I was awarded the\order of the Red Flagrom the Soviet Government, but I did not take part either in the Battle of Stalingrad\or in the capture of Berlin. I don’t know\where the authors of the dictionaries got such materials. But anyway, it is true that those articles reflect something of the climate in the training base, seething with enthusiasm to join the war.
The existence of the IAF struck terror into the hearts of the Japanese imperialists who were afraid of the alliance between the armed forces of Korea, the Soviet\union\and China. Conversely, it gave unbounded confidence to our people.
The enemy produced numerous materials with regard to the fact that the great leader set up a training base in the Soviet\union\and made preparations for the final operations against Japan. They read in part:
“Kim Il Sung’s movements:
“Kim Il Sung, now staying in the Soviet\union, left Khabarovsk last summer\and went to Yanan. There he met such leaders of the CPC as Mao Ze-dong, He Long\and Kang Sheng,\and held a number of discussions with them on the cooperation between the Army of the CPC\and the Anti-Japanese Allied Army, before\and after the outbreak of the war between Japan\and the Soviet\union, as well as on the future activities of the Anti-Japanese Allied Army. Then he met a Korean CPC member in the vicinity of Yanan,\and they exchanged opinions on various matters.
“Towards the end of last year, Kim Il Sung returned to the Soviet\unionrom Yanan by air. He is now in the neighbourhood of Khabarovsk\and devoting himself to intelligence\and ideological work regarding Manchuria\and Korea. Moreover, it is said that he has admitted about 300 people, including Korean\and Chinese communist bandits,\and Korean\and Manchurian recalcitrants\and captives who had entered the Soviet\union, to the training camp in the vicinity of Khabarovsk\and, under the guidance\and with the help of the Khabarovsk Red Army, is giving training\and education to them so that they will be able to enter Manchuria all together before\and after the beginning of the war between Japan\and the Soviet\union,\and carry out the task of harassing the rear of the Japanese army.” (Information sent by the chief of the Namyang police station to the chief of the police department of North Hamgyong Province, February 21, Showa 19 (1944).)
“Kim Il Sung is said to be in Yanan now\and sending troops to Rehe Province. Moreover, there are four divisions formed entirely of Koreans in Nikolayevski (in the Maritime Province of Siberia). When a war breaks out between Japan\and the Soviet\union, these troops will land in the area of north Korea as a death-defying corps\or descend on Korea by parachute.” (A file of cases (4) on seditious actions for harassing the rear\and staging an armed uprising during the Great East Asia War, centring around graduates of Kyongsong University, Kowon police station, Showa 20 (1945).)
“It seems that a man who came back across Siberia has said that there is an encampment four kilometres in circumference in one place in Siberia,\and that there is a Korean flag flying there,\and that he has seen Korean soldiers guarding it.” (Monthly Report by the Special Political Police, p. 79, Security Police Bureau, Ministry of the Interior, Showa 19 (1944).)
The news of the formation of the IAF exerted a favourable influence on the anti-Japanese patriotic forces fighting in Northeast China. Many times the soldiers of the NAJAA in Manchuria crossed the river\and joined the allied forces in groups of two\or three. Sometimes soldiers of the puppet Manchukuo army rose in revolt against the officers\and joined the allied forces.
Once, I cannot remember whether it was before\or after the\organization of the allied forces, one company of a regiment of the puppet Manchukuo army stationed in Donganzhen, Raohe County, executed their commander\and Japanese officers,\and crossed the Ussuri River in a wooden boat bringing with them a large number of rifles, machine-guns, grenade throwers\and other weapons. We warmly welcomed them\and enlisted them.
Following the formation of the IAF, we intensified combat\and political training,\and accelerated preparations for our operations against Japan.
The most important task confronting us in those days was to consolidate the ranks of the KPRA politically\and militarily.
It can be said that the fundamental principles of military operations are identical for any kind of war, be it an ancient war, a mediaeval war\or a modern war. What is important is how to have a command of the means of war as they develop\and how to\organize cooperation\and joint operations between various services\and arms.
We made serious efforts to master modern tactics,\and our efforts were redoubled following the formation of the IAF. The capability of the soldiers of the KPRA for using modern tactics freely was raised to a considerable level through training\and studying at the training base.
At the same time as perfecting the guerrilla tactics which they had practised on the wide plateau around Mt. Paektu, they familiarized themselves with modern tactics to meet the requirements of a regular army.
By doing so, they admirably played their political\and military roles as the main force of the Korean revolution.
The Soviet Far East Forces also made great efforts for the rapid improvement of the fighting efficiency of the IAF.
Around mid-November 1942, Apanasenko\organized a military exercise of a brigade of the Soviet Far East Forces stationed in the south,\and invited the leading commanders of the allied forces to inspect it.
That day we wentrom Khabarovsk to that brigade in an armoured train. On the following day, the brigade held a winter exercise. A large number of armed forces including four infantry battalions as well as tank, artillery, mortar, signal\and anti-tank gun battalions took part in the exercise.
It was the military exercise of a large scale we had ever seen, so it aroused our curiosity\and interest.
The task given to the brigade was to attack\and annihilate the enemy on a hill\and capture the hill. The attack, which started at noon, was over only at four o’clock in the afternoon.
Later, we also inspected the military exercise of another brigade stationed on the Amur River in the suburbs of Khabarovsk.
The brigade was assigned the task of mustering the unit around a village called Belizovka\and getting ready for battle. That exercise, too, left a deep impression on us.
In Khabarovsk we also inspected a parade of the units of the Far East Forces. I quite envied the various kinds of modern military equipment\and combat material that had been mobilized for the military exercises\and parade. “When shall we be able to have such a modernized army?” This is what I thought of most during my inspection of the military exercises\and parade. My resolve to build a regular army immediately after liberating the country was strengthened during my stay at the training base in the Far East region.
Thanks to the serious efforts of\and cooperation between the military commanders of Korea, the Soviet\union\and China, the IAF were able to develop, in a short time, into armed forces capable of coping with modern warfare.
Even when the Soviet\union badly needed the strength of another single regiment\or a single battalion because of the extremely difficult situation at the front, it never touched the allied forces, but helped them so that they could make full preparations for the showdown against the Japanese imperialists.
Soviet military personnel frequently told us about how much Stalin valued the officers\and men of the KPRA\and the NAJAA. They told that Stalin had said that all the soldiers of these armies were valuable people who would make a major contribution to liberating their own motherlands\and building a new country,\and that, therefore, they should take care of these soldiers lest there should be a single loss.
The formation\and development of the IAF in the Soviet Far East region served as a good model for uniting the resistance forces of Czechoslovakia\and Poland in Europe.
Simultaneously with the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship\and Mutual Cooperation between the Soviet\union\and Czechoslovakia in 1943, a unit of Czechoslovaks was\organized in the territory of the Soviet\union to take part in the joint struggle against Hitlerite Germany, together with the Red Army. The Czechoslovak brigade took part in a number of military operations such as the battles to liberate Kiev\and Belaya Serkovi,\and made many brilliant achievements.
Poland also created, in the territory of the Soviet\union, an army to fight against fascist Germany. The Polish corps participated in a series of military operations to liberate Polandrom the claws of the German fascist occupationists, beginning with the battle to liberate Lublin.
The news of the dissolution of the Comintern reached the training base in May 1943, when we were active in the Soviet\union following the formation of the IAF. People at the base wondered why the Comintern, which had existed for over 20 years as the leading\organ of the world revolution, had been dissolved in the middle of the Second World War, when international solidarity\and cooperation were most urgent for a showdown against fascism.
It was in 1919 that Lenin\organized the Comintern. I think there were two reasons for its dissolution: One was that, while the Comintern was leading the world revolution, in various countries communist parties\and revolutionary forces grew so strong that they were able to promote revolution in their own countries independently in accordance with their own line\and relying on their own efforts, even without its centralist leadership\and involvement.
Another reason was that the existence of the Comintern was an obstacle to realizing a more extensive, worldwide anti-fascist alliance. The anti-fascist alliance during the Second World War was a new aspect which transcended differences in ideas\and social systems. The stand which transcended ideas\and systems\and was taken by the countries forming the alliance in the confrontation with fascism made possible the alliance between the Soviet\union, a socialist country,\and the United States, Britain\and France, capitalist countries, as well as the cooperation between communists\and bourgeois Right-wing politicians. This situation made them reconsider the existence of the Comintern, the mission of which was to oppose imperialism\and to communize the world.
We admitted that the dissolution of the Comintern was an opportune measure which fully conformed with the requirements of the international communist movement\and the development of the situation prevailing at that time.
We felt great pride in the fact that,rom the outset of our struggle, we had done everything independently at every revolutionary stage, adopting our own strategy\and tactics\and building the revolutionary force by our own efforts instead of by relying on the strength\or line of others.
The dissolution of the Comintern, however, did not imply the demise of international solidarity\and cooperation among communists.
등록된 댓글이 없습니다.
E-mail: : firstname.lastname@example.org